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Have You Restructured For Global Success? 
By Nirmalya KUMAR & Phanish PURANAM 
Harvard Business Review, Oct 2011, Vol.89 (10), pp. 123-129. 
Two summers ago, Frits van Paasschen, the CEO of Starwood Hotels, was talking to his wife, Laura, 
about China. With 70 properties in operation there and 80 more being built, the People’s Republic had 
just become Starwood’s second-largest market, after the United States. Van Paasschen jokingly said, “It’s 
almost like we should move our headquarters there.” Laura’s response, in a nutshell: Perhaps you should. 
A year later, van Paasschen did just that—for a month. From June 8 to July 11, 2011, Starwood’s eight-
member top management team worked out of Shanghai, doing business 12 hours ahead of, rather than 
behind, the company’s official White Plains, New York, headquarters. Starwood now plans to shift its 
base for a month every year to fast-growing markets such as Brazil, Dubai, and India. The end result of 
these relocations remains unclear: They may prove to be symbolic, they could be learning moments, or 
they might portend a permanent move of Starwood’s headquarters. Today they epitomize the mounting 
pressures on multinational companies’ organizational structures. 
As emerging markets grew explosively in the first decade of the 21st century, multinationals raced to 
develop new strategies. However, changes in their organizational structures have been slow to follow, and 
people and processes are coping—but badly. Corporations are trying to shoehorn global operations into 
existing structures, which is in part why so many are unable to realize the full potential of emerging 
markets. In fact, 95% of senior executives say that they doubt their companies have the right operating 
model (of which structure is a key component) for today’s world, according to a 2011 Accenture study. 
Organizational redesigns are complicated and politically messy, however, so responses have ranged from 
outright denial to grudging acceptance; only a few companies are actually trying to fix the problem. 
The pressures on multinational structures seem likely to intensify. Businesses are increasingly seeking not 
just suppliers and raw materials in emerging markets such as China and India, but also customers. The 
recent recession has served as a catalyst: Many Western companies believe they have focused too much 
and for too long on the developed world. Moreover, multinational corporations are scouting for new 
products and services in developing countries—not just to break into them, but also to kick-start growth at 
home by offering more value for less money. GE’s recent “reverse innovation” success with its MAC 400 
and 400i portable electrocardiography machines in India, for example, may seem simple, but most 
companies struggle to develop such innovations in developing countries or to transplant locally developed 
innovations worldwide. Such efforts sorely challenge established structures and processes. 
At the same time, the nature of innovation is becoming more global because of technological advances. 
Organizations are figuring out how to break up and distribute, across nations and locations, tightly 
integrated tasks once performed at only a single site. This global division of R&D facilitates 
intrafunctional specialization among countries. The advantages include conducting work where the best 
expertise exists, at the lowest possible cost; exploiting time zone variation to operate 24/7; and mitigating 
risks by building redundancies across locations. The management dilemmas are, of course, substantial: 
How do you choose which processes to distribute and where to relocate them? How do you reintegrate 
them across borders? How do you get people to work effectively across organizational, national, cultural, 
and time zone barriers? 
What’s emerging is a new structure, which we call the T-shaped country organization. It helps to localize 
customer-facing operations even as it distributes back-end activities across countries. Showing the way 
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are companies, such as GE, Intel, and AstraZeneca, that are adapting ideas from the Indian IT-offshoring 
industry and, in the process, rewriting the way corporations should think about structures. 
Why Existing Structures Are Deficient 
Figuring out how to manage product lines, regions, and functions has been a perennial problem for 
multinational companies. Most started out by forming international sales divisions with country-specific 
subunits at home and by locating only customer-facing (or front-end) processes in each country. 
Several companies later adopted transnational structures in order to exploit location-specific advantages 
in countries far from their home base. Each country’s operations specialized in part of the value chain (for 
instance, Germany focused on product engineering and Mexico on manufacturing) or, sometimes, product 
lines (Japan developed CT scanners, for example, and Europe X-ray machines). 
Other corporations have adopted matrix structures; the axes of the matrix may be products, businesses, 
functions, or regions. At companies such as ABB and Unilever, managers in an emerging market may 
have one reporting relationship for product lines and another for functions or regions. One or the other of 
those relationships tends to dominate in practice, despite their equal importance in theory. 
What Kind of Multinational Structure Fits Your Company? 
This two-part diagnostic tool can help you calibrate, on scales ranging from 1 to 5, how geographically 
clustered or dispersed the key capabilities of your businesses are—and gauge whether your organization 
can collaborate seamlessly across geographies. Plot the two scores on the graph (right) to identify an 
appropriate global structure for your company. 
A. How geographically clustered or dispersed are the skills, capabilities, and resources needed for 
your businesses to operate? 
Highly Clustered: Most are found in one region, often the home region. SCORE 1 
Example: Sharp historically has done most of its R&D and manufacturing in Japan. It set up sales units 
abroad only during the early stages of its international expansion. 
Moderately Clustered: Most are found in one region, although different regions may possess advantages 
for different functions. SCORE 3 
Example: Many consumer goods companies today locate manufacturing in Asia, but R&D and product 
design remain in the U.S. 
Highly Distributed: Most are spread across multiple regions. SCORE 5 
Example: When GE develops new jet engines, it relies on its China unit to design for manufacture, its 
India unit for analytics and materials science, and its German labs for wind-tunnel testing. 
Score for A:_ 
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B. How competent are people in your organization at working closely across geographies? 
Not Very Competent: Effectiveness is confined within specific geographies, functions, and product 
divisions. SCORE 1 
Symptoms: Large technical and cultural differences exist within functions. IT systems don’t permit 
effective collaboration. Resistance to rotating people across countries is strong. 
Moderately Competent: People are somewhat effective at working across geographies, functions, and 
product divisions. SCORE 3 
Symptoms: Some but not all of the key ingredients—common language and organizational culture, IT 
systems that allow remote collaboration, and rotation of employees—are in place. 
Highly Competent: People are adept at working across geographies, functions, and product divisions. 
SCORE 5 
Symptoms: Most or all of the key ingredients of collaboration are in place. 
 
 
A variant involves organizing front-end and back-end operations differently. For instance, in 2001 Cisco 
created a structure that grouped marketing and sales by customer segment but R&D activities by product 
line. Between the two, the company set up a solutions group that integrated products into a bundle 
tailored for each customer. A combination of matrix and back-end integration entails centralizing back-
end operations in the home country while managing customer-facing processes via a matrix of product 
lines and countries. That’s how pharmaceutical giants such as Pfizer and tobacco companies such as 
B.A.T. Industries are organized. 
For companies that are keen to tap into the full potential of emerging markets, none of these structures is 
performing as well as they once did, our research indicates. Three reasons explain the change: 
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One, the emergence of China and India as leading markets, combined with minimal growth in the 
developed world, has made the former “stars” and turned the latter into mere “cash cows.” Traditionally 
perceived as add-ons, whose modified products yielded supplementary revenue, China and India are now 
major sources of demand, with distinct consumer needs that companies must address. Existing structures 
don’t facilitate that effort because the balance they strike among products, businesses, functions, and 
regions is no longer adequate in these two markets. 
Two, China and India are becoming sources of talent for developing new products and processes. This 
trend has resulted in the global segmentation of R&D and in intrafunctional specialization among 
countries, as mentioned earlier. Corporations can segment R&D vertically into distinct processes that 
capture customer requirements; generate product specifications; search for technological solutions to meet 
those specifications; prototype results; and then engineer for manufacture. For instance, Microsoft’s 
product development team in Hyderabad, India, develops software according to specifications from its 
U.S. counterparts in Redmond, Washington. That kind of vertical segmentation requires temporal 
sequencing of each step in the process. 
Segmenting R&D horizontally is an alternative technique used to develop multicomponent technologies 
such as engines, hardware, and advanced software. Organizations design components in parallel in 
different countries and create interfaces that enable assembly and interoperability. With horizontal 
segmentation, a unit in China can contribute its design-for-manufacture expertise; one in India can 
provide analytics and materials science expertise; and another in Germany can chip in with wind-tunnel 
testing—as happens in GE’s jet engines business. 
The shift of innovation activities will likely be self-perpetuating. To perform cutting-edge work, a person 
must have engaged in less-sophisticated tasks earlier. New entrants work their way up a ladder. You can’t 
become a partner in a consulting firm without having been an associate, an investment banker without 
having served as an analyst, or the head of a clinical research team without having worked as a research 
assistant. In each case, the senior people know exactly what their juniors do because of experience. 
Without such knowledge, senior managers, arguably, cannot do their jobs effectively or make use of input 
from juniors. 
Geography is fracturing these skill ladders; the lowest rungs for many jobs are now located in developing 
countries. With those rungs having moved out of the West or having become less remunerative, Western 
students are less likely to invest in climbing them. The limited availability of talent will, in turn, reinforce 
the trend of moving the lower rungs of the skill ladder offshore, and so on. To be clear, we are not arguing 
that Silicon Valley will collapse or that R&D centers in the West are likely to shut down anytime soon. 
But companies deciding whether to open a new R&D lab in New Jersey or Basel, Switzerland, will 
increasingly need to justify why they shouldn’t do so in Beijing or Hyderabad, where talent is relatively 
plentiful and cheaper. The locations multinationals choose for developing their innovation capabilities are 
likely to change dramatically in the future. 
Three, the assumption that multinational corporations’ intellectual leadership should come only from 
developed markets persists. After all, they used to be the largest and the most profitable markets. Despite 
the lip service paid to globalization nowadays, estimates suggest that fewer than 15% of Fortune Global 
500 companies have a CEO from outside their bases. Organizational cultures, too, reflect developed 
nations’ dominance in intellectual leadership: Think of American creativity at Apple, German reliability 
at Daimler, Norwegian egalitarianism at Telenor, and so on. 
But change is becoming necessary. If China and India turn out to be both a company’s largest markets 
and its major sources of innovation, something has to give. Few multinationals can escape the 
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Asianization of their top management teams. As leadership composition changes, the political center of 
gravity also will shift eastward. Unless corporations adapt to the new loci of innovation and growth, 
which will change the organizational fabric, they are unlikely to grow as fast as rivals will. 
Falling Into the Gaps 
These tectonic forces are together opening a set of gaps between multinational companies’ ambitions and 
achievements in emerging markets. 
The passion gap. 
Multinational companies’ subsidiaries in China and India frequently complain about top management’s 
lack of commitment to their markets. Senior executives may pay lip service to growth in China and India, 
and may visit them frequently, but Asian countries are high-context cultures where executives and 
investors seek signs that are more tangible than public appearances and pronouncements. Cultural barriers 
often make local managers suspect that the global leadership isn’t excited by foreign markets. They may 
be right: According to upper echelon theory, the composition of top management teams affects 
companies’ strategic choices. For example, if several senior executives have backgrounds in finance, the 
company is more likely to rely on M&A. Conversely, the lack of emerging-market experience at the top 
tends to limit the commitment to developing countries. 
The ambition gap. 
Most multinational corporations are headquartered in nations whose economies grow today, at most, 
between 1% and 3% a year. Their CEOs are delighted when overseas subsidiaries deliver double-digit 
sales growth, but Chinese and Indian entrepreneurs would deem it unacceptable just to reach that 
threshold. They demand—and invest aggressively to achieve—at least 25% growth year after year. By 
contrast, Western companies prefer to report revenues and earnings to Wall Street as per their forecasts, 
which are usually conservative. In addition, many companies refuse to make significant overseas 
investments simply because short-term profits and management bonuses may suffer. 
The value-proposition gap. 
Most Chinese and Indian customers are constrained by low incomes and budgets, forcing Western 
companies to revise their business models and, sometimes, reinvent them completely. Local 
entrepreneurs, trying to ramp up businesses quickly, are short of capital, too: They often have to pay 
annual interest rates on borrowings of about 15% (China is an exception), compared with 5% in the 
developed world. The high cost of capital has led some Indian companies to develop unique business 
models. For instance, Bharti Airtel outsources IT infrastructure and customer services; buys network 
capacity instead of equipment; and has merged its infrastructure with that of rivals, thereby limiting the 
investment required to scale up. Many Western companies find it tough to make inroads against local 
competitors that have adapted well to these conditions. 
The product line gap. 
Many transnational giants have not pushed their R&D operations to innovate for the great mass of 
middle-market consumers in developing countries, or tried to tailor products to local preferences, or even 
localized their marketing activities. For example, how does BMW’s tag line, “The ultimate driving 
machine,” translate in China, where BMWs are usually driven by chauffeurs? How do luxury companies 
change their product lines from the understated markers of status that are popular in the West to the 
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“bling” that many emerging-market consumers covet? A few Western companies do develop products 
exclusively for China and India, but most are content to skim the surface of these markets’ potential. 
The Two Strokes of the T-Shaped Structure 
Multinational subsidiaries in emerging markets must reorganize themselves so that they can cope better 
with two sets of pressures. On the customer side, they need to move faster, make more decisions locally, 
and alter the incentives and career opportunities offered to employees. In other words, their front-end 
operations must become highly localized. Given the size of emerging markets like China and India, a high 
level of localization doesn’t preclude economies of scale. 
On the back end of the value chain, transnational companies should use emerging markets as platforms 
for globally segmented innovation, manufacturing, and offshore services. They must break up operations 
such as product development and R&D, relocate them, possibly across several countries, and integrate 
them across the world. The issue is no longer simply whether to integrate a subsidiary or give it more 
autonomy; the answer will depend on whether you’re talking about front-end or back-end processes. 
These imperatives demand new responses. Companies must let front-end, or customer-facing, processes 
in emerging markets enjoy greater autonomy. Back-end processes, particularly product development and 
R&D, need not be collocated; they could be broken up and integrated across countries to foster global 
development and manufacturing, not just sharing of ideas. That dual approach yields a T-shaped form: 
The horizontal stroke represents linkages across countries; the vertical stroke illustrates the need for depth 
within each country. A T-shaped structure is thus a response to the fact that emerging markets are 
increasingly becoming lead markets as well as talent pools. 
The T-shaped country structure can be seen as an extension of the transnational structure, with one 
difference: It distributes parts of functions—not entire functions—geographically, which requires 
unprecedented integration across countries. This differs from the avoidance of duplication across 
geographies or “nice to have” horizontal exchanges of best practices. Each country unit will have its own 
area of expertise, and all areas will be necessary for developing new products and services. In each 
country, the horizontal and vertical strokes of the “T” will be connected loosely. For instance, in India the 
global R&D centers of companies such as Intel, GE, and Microsoft have a few projects to develop 
products for local customers, but most of the work supports global product development. 
Past research has shown that companies can use two complementary approaches to coordinate processes 
across geographies: separation and integration. Separation entails isolating the activities in each country 
and minimizing interactions among countries. Partitioning work in this way allows companies to divide 
tasks across the globe and exploit local skills. For example, GE’s John F Welch Technology Centre, in 
Bangalore, embodies GE’s worldwide capability for computational modeling, and AstraZeneca’s unit in 
Bangalore specializes in tropical medicine. Setting up such centers of expertise means that work can 
proceed largely independently across locations. 
When these spatially distributed pieces of specialist work can’t be completely black-boxed, they must be 
integrated. One approach involves building formal channels for coordination. These include assigning 
integration roles (such as that of program manager), locating some employees physically close to others, 
and opening direct channels of communication to help bridge distances. Ensuring that people speak the 
same “language” (and that doesn’t mean English) augments the efficacy of these channels. At GE, design 
engineers from R&D centers around the world collaborate effectively because, as a senior GE Bangalore 
manager puts it, “We all speak the language of Six Sigma.” 
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Companies can also use tacit coordination—in other words, without extensive communication—for the 
same purpose. This relies on shared decision-making procedures, a common vocabulary, and the ability to 
observe work as it happens across locations. Research has shown that some companies have figured out 
how to let software engineers in different locations coordinate their iterative programming and bug-fixing 
activities without communicating in detail. The engineers draw instead on the knowledge they share—
which comes from common training and the use of workflow software—to anticipate colleagues’ 
responses to problems. Even when the engineers had poor substitutes for face-to-face interactions (such as 
webcams, telephone, and e-mail), they successfully managed cognitive collocation. A senior scientist at 
AstraZeneca’s Bangalore unit told us, “When people share the same understanding about work 
procedures, data, methods, and the underlying science, the need to pick up the phone and ask a question 
doesn’t arise too often.” 
The soft factors underlying the mutual understanding shared by geographically dispersed teams have hard 
consequences, in that they limit the need for travel and prevent coordination failures. Here’s how 
Guillermo Wille, who used to head GE’s Bangalore R&D campus, summarized the challenge: “People 
usually don’t trust their counterparts who are sitting 11,000 miles away. If you think about it, though, few 
companies have the luxury of having all their technologists sitting in one building….The behavioral 
reality is that if people are sitting in different buildings, they already pick up the phone or communicate 
through computers. If you understand that, and have created a culture of treating your teams in the next 
building or those 11,000 miles away the same, you have it. The only caveat is the time difference, which 
generates issues in work/life balance. That’s the problem you face.” 
Challenges for Top Teams 
Amid the focus on structure, it’s easy to forget that leaders are the people who make organizations tick 
globally. The rise of emerging markets has major implications for how top management teams are 
configured, where they sit physically, and how they operate culturally. 
“Repeopling” the leadership tier. 
Multinational companies will increasingly have to move people from emerging markets, especially 
Chinese and Indian managers, into leadership positions. Companies in financial services, consulting, and 
technology, where opportunities have migrated quickly to China and India, have been among the first to 
do so. As a bridging mechanism, companies like P&G rotate non-U.S. executives in and out of 
headquarters. Many corporations, including P&G and Unilever, have asked the China and India heads to 
report directly to the worldwide CEO or have accorded them the status of regional heads. Samsung’s 
China CEO, for instance, is regarded as one of the company’s top three executives worldwide. 
Redrawing HQ geography. 
Before Asian managers enter the C-suite, Western companies may move closer to China and India. In 
2006 McDonald’s located its Asia head to China—its first regional head outside Oak Brook, Illinois. IBM 
created a growth-markets headquarters in 2008, based in Shanghai and responsible for Asia (non-Japan), 
Latin America, Russia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. In 2009 HSBC’s then-CEO, Michael 
Geoghegan, moved from London to Hong Kong to focus on emerging markets, and GM moved the 
responsibility for global purchasing from Detroit to Shanghai. In 2011 Bayer shifted the base of its 
general medicines division to Beijing. And GE’s health care unit, the world’s biggest manufacturer of 
medical-imaging machines, is moving the headquarters of the 115-year-old business from Waukesha, 
Wisconsin, to Beijing. When Irdeto set up dual headquarters in Hoofddorp, the Netherlands, and in 
Beijing, the CEO moved to China with his family. In the not-too-distant future, some multinational 
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companies may toy with the idea of splitting headquarters functions, with compliance staying in the West 
but intellectual leadership moving to Asia—permanently. 
Recognizing cultural shifts. 
Not surprisingly, the rise of China and India is leading to discontent among some multinational 
companies’ senior executives who work in developed countries, which still account for most of their 
profits. However, these markets are growing slowly, competition is intensifying, and profit margins are 
falling. Besides, as a senior executive at the energy and water company Nalco recently noted, companies 
often have to dismantle something in mature markets to build elsewhere. Before Western executives start 
packing their bags for emerging markets, they must realize that expat managers may not always be 
welcomed: They’re expensive, often wunable to speak the local language, and lack local networks. On the 
other hand, expats are likely to be more valued in back-end functions such as R&D and product 
development, where global segmentation requires intracompany networks and deep technical knowledge. 
No organizational design is perfect or permanent. Smart executives recognize that they must make trade-
offs that are appropriate to the economic climate, competitive context, and corporate history. The 
challenge for CEOs is to let the energy, ambition, and optimism they sense in China and India coexist 
with their developed-market units. Local subsidiaries, frustrated by the shackles that HQ places on them, 
are increasingly demanding that the worldwide leadership move to emerging markets, defer to them, or 
get out of the way. Deploying the T-shaped country organization can help companies to walk the 
tightrope between their operations in developed and rapidly developing countries, to knit people across 
countries, and to thereby create global competitive advantage. 
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